

Recommend/Suggest

- P. Morten on CM count should be a standing agenda item for WAOCC
- - Reporting of PMs might be Chair, WAOCC.
- John Bird did some of this
e.g. Achille Lauro

Agenda for Future

2. Have additional meeting after election in Nov. Additional meetings.

2. Work up some information art form or handbook for the transition team

3. Continue to shape the WAOCC members as a community of purpose and function.

4. Update 1984 pub,
issued by DCT on WAOCC
- ensure dissemination

→ critique session

Discussion clustered, it

Seems, on several areas

Recent improvements

Challenges to Intelligence & Centers

~~End of the road~~

Agenda for the future

Improvements

→ WHCMWG

1. Revival of WAOCC
2. New Center OSD Crisis Coord. Center
3. NOIWOA upgrade
4. New uses of SVT-5
5. Critic developments

Challenges

1. marketing ourselves during transition

2. New ways of doing business - applications of technology

daily
Conf

- habits of
working together
- W.H.S. Room

3. Making sure centers who need ^{info/} data
get it timely, relevantly & accurately.
-- Justice

4. Need to do after-action summaries
of crisis procedures.

-- lessons learned

sessions

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Warning and Crisis Management (CM)

I. Perspectives

NICW has lots of responsibilities, not lots of authority to command.

Working together makes it work.

Hard to imagine a less efficient system for Warning and CM
cover everything from Chernobyl to Threat of War
from Timbuktu (Mali) to China
from ^{Hi} tech Surprise to low tech terror.

All fall within our responsibility.

We hardly ever have an audit trail ~~tracking~~
what worked. Success has many fathers... and of
course failure is always our fault.

As said, in many ways we have
no system at all, but rather a confederation of willing
partners. This succeeds in helping inform policy
as much through strength of will as through quality
of communications.

STAT

II. Differences

We ought to be clear about some realities.
Intelligence successes are not necessarily warning successes
Warning successes may not lead to policy successes
Crisis management success ~~problems~~ is also an entirely separate affair.
In the final analysis we are not just providing

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any old service, but an information service that means, communications, and that is a very basic and delicate human process.

Examples.

JIC cable on detecting Soviet War prep 1 week's firm warning might be an intell. success, in a narrow sense it might be a warning success, but it ought not be confused with adequate warning to support policy options.

It might be we can't do any better, in reality, but it seems we ought to try. I believe we can do a lot better.

Our recent successes in ^{Gulf} Naval ops obscure the fact that a ship was damaged first. My own effort to warn of renewed mining was timely reliable and accurate, no one listened.

Panama, too, gives eloquent testimony to the limits of good intelligence and warning.

Threat Management

So there exists a spectrum of ways to manage threats before they become crises and after they recycle during a crisis.

We can't do the policy maker's job, but to the extent that ~~at~~ our own house needs cleaning, we must put our affairs in order.

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Considering our loose confederal setup,
we need to do things that maximize the strengths.

- Better technical links
- More analytical & report aids
- Marketing
 - anything that keeps us talking and working together

I believe the way the system works is to ~~send~~ enough signals that the message gets through even though the messenger can't be identified clearly.

It's often more important to say something at all, than to be brilliant in what you say.

IV Crises in Peacetime

Dick Clark gave a run down on 21 different crises that his center reacted to.

I suggest those fell into several categories:

- ~~Some~~ ^{A few} involved danger to the US
- Some involved US or our allies threatening our enemies
- Some involved damage to our enemies and we watched.

As crisis managers, all make demands on our centers, but not the same demands.

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In my view, these represent the exercising of the system in peacetime, mentioned yesterday as missing. We have to react to today's crises with a view towards those larger dangers we hope to avoid.

V War Threats

No notice - cold start

We worry a lot about this and so do our allies. Conventional arms reduction will help allay concerns about this a lot.

It's a danger, but I think we've done as much as we can to guard against this.

DIA's system seems well prepared for this. Whether it's a real danger or mostly just perceived, it's important to be prepared

But a more troublesome danger is Reinforced ATK.

My concern is that the operations of our systems and centers could dull us. We could miss the forest.

I know all of you are worried about these problems too. But this is where the rubber meets the road in the sense that intelligence, warning, crisis management and policy must succeed. Batting averages and all the other jargon of national security literature won't do the job.

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Warning of war worries us a lot but it really doesn't preoccupy us the way these non-war crises do. And I believe it's important to not lose sight of this larger horizon.

II Centers & Warning

Your centers help manage crises. That's quite a change over the years. Years ago, such centers as yours tended to tip-off other intelligence components more than anything else.

Now, you deal directly upwards towards the top of intelligence and policy making and downward to the people in the field. Technology has made this more possible than ever before. This is a new development, less than 20 years old.

The demands on personnel seem staggering. The watch standers are analysts now, or they should be. But they also straddle operations too. This is close to a new ~~and~~ type of intelligence specialty and is moving increasingly to stake out its own identity.

I continue to insist that the centers play an important warning role both early

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in threat and opportunity recognition And
late as the crisis breaks.

I see ^{several} ~~two~~ very real dangers
 -- loss of perspective about the
 range of threats;
 -- diversion of ^{vigilance} ~~attention~~ because of
 self-generated requirements;
 -- fascination with the crisis management
 process and technology that overwhelms
 sound thinking or analysis.

I believe the technological problems
 are important, but ultimately workable, with
~~the highest~~ many
 benchmarks and measurable achievements.
 The human proportions need constant
 attention. And that's the most enduring
~~message of~~ message of
 warning: only people warn.